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Why Psychologists Must Change the Way They Analyze Their Data: The Case of Psi

⚑ Contested β†—
Wagenmakers, Eric-Jan, Wetzels, Ruud, Borsboom, Denny, van der Maas, Han β€’ 2011 Modern Era β€’ skeptical

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Plain English Summary

When a well-known psychologist published data apparently showing people can see the future, Wagenmakers and colleagues said: not so fast. They re-crunched all nine of Daryl Bem's precognition experiments using Bayesian statistics -- a method that directly measures how much evidence supports one idea over another. The verdict was brutal: only one out of ten tests showed even modest support for psychic powers, while three actually favored the boring explanation that nothing paranormal happened. The rest were a statistical shrug. The team pinpointed where Bem went wrong: mixing up exploratory fishing expeditions with rigorous hypothesis testing, and leaning on p-values that dramatically oversell the evidence. They capped it off with a practical reform blueprint, including pre-registering studies and inviting skeptics to collaborate on experiments. This paper became a rallying cry in psychology's broader reckoning with its own statistical habits.

Research Notes

Landmark skeptical critique that became central to the replication crisis narrative in psychology. Demonstrates how standard frequentist methods can produce 'significant' results for implausible claims. Directly triggered Bem, Utts & Johnson's rebuttal and the Wagenmakers et al. (2012) confirmatory research agenda.

Reanalysis of Bem's (2011) nine precognition experiments using a default Bayesian t-test reveals that the statistical evidence for psi is weak to nonexistent. Of 10 critical tests, only one yields 'substantial' Bayesian evidence for psi (BF01 = 0.17); three yield 'substantial' evidence for the null hypothesis (BF01 = 3.14 to 7.61); the remaining six produce only 'anecdotal' evidence in either direction. The paper identifies three flaws in Bem's approach: conflation of exploratory and confirmatory analyses, the fallacy of the transposed conditional, and reliance on p-values that overstate evidence against the null. Proposes six guidelines for confirmatory research including pre-registration, Bayesian testing, and adversarial collaboration.

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πŸ“‹ Cite this paper
APA
Wagenmakers, Eric-Jan, Wetzels, Ruud, Borsboom, Denny, van der Maas, Han (2011). Why Psychologists Must Change the Way They Analyze Their Data: The Case of Psi. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0022790
BibTeX
@article{wagenmakers_2011_why_psychologists,
  title = {Why Psychologists Must Change the Way They Analyze Their Data: The Case of Psi},
  author = {Wagenmakers, Eric-Jan and Wetzels, Ruud and Borsboom, Denny and van der Maas, Han},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
  doi = {10.1037/a0022790},
}